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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
failure to reject an order for a meal within a reasonable time was acceptance.
Cole-Mcfntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Halloway (1919) 141 Tenn. 679, 214 S. W. 817;
cf. 1 Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1932) sec. 72.
The courts have apparently gone no further, although one authority has
suggested that silence alone should be acceptance in the cases of an offer of
forbearance and of a bilateral contract when a reasonable man would deem
silence to show an intention to assent. 1 Williston, Law of Contracts (1931)
secs. 91, 91a. It is submitted that silence alone is an exceedingly impractical
basis for a conclusion in regard to the existence of any affirmative mental at-
titude in the offeree.
From the decisions it is possible to deduce a single guiding principle.
Silence is acceptance only when there are other circumstances, exclusive of
the silence, which tend to show that assent is the intention of the offeree. A
positive act is something from which intention can be determined objectively.
Silence alone is, at the most, merely ambiguous as far as showing the mental
condition of an individual is concerned.
In the principal case the act of the defendant in requesting the plaintiff
to discontinue the suit pending in New York is a circumstance in addition to
silence. Both taken together signify acceptance, although neither would be
sufficient by itself. The plaintiff had already stated his charge at the request
of his client, who by his act of terminating suit whose prosecution was essen-
tial to the fulfilment of the previous agreement signified his acceptance of
the only other arrangement before the parties. N. P., '34.
DEED OF TRUST-EFFECT OF PROVISION GIVING TRusm ExcLUsivE PowER
TO RENEW INSURANCE PoLIcIES.-A deed of trust provided for the assignment
to the trustee of all insurance policies on the property covered. It further
provided that the trustee was to have the exclusive right to renew or change
the insurance carried on the property, subject to a duty to keep a certain
stated amount of each kind of insurance in force. There was a further pro-
vision that the trustee might acquire for his own benefit, if he so desired,
any of the serial notes to be issued under the deed of trust. The debtor
notified the trustee not to take out new insurance and when the old policies ex-
pired tendered assignment of new policies in solvent companies. Neverthe-
less, the trustee took out new insurance. The trustee was a real estate
broker and received commissions from the insurance companies on all poli-
cies written by him. The trustee was attempting to* sell the land as was
allowed by the deed of trust because the debtor refused to pay the premiums
on the insurance policies taken out by the trustee. Held, the clause is valid
and gives the trustee an irrevocable power to take out insurance and force
the debtor to pay for it. Hadley Bros.-Uhl Co. v. Scott (Mo. App. 1932) 53
S. W. (2d) 1071.
Although such clauses have become common in recent deeds of trust, this
is the first case which passes on the validity of such a provision. In an
early Illinois case a similar provision was involved, but there the validity of
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the clause was not considered, the attempt being to hold the trustee on the
ground that he became a guarantor of the solvency of the insurance com-
panies, which had failed to pay after the house was destroyed by fire. Lia-
bility was denied on the ground that the trustee was only bound to use
ordinary care in selecting insurance companies which were solvent at the
time he selected them. Gettins v. Scudder (1875) 71 Ill. 86. All parties as-
sumed that the clause was valid.
The Missouri Court reaches its conclusion by a simple line of reasoning.
The opinion admits the general rule that a trustee cannot personally profit
from dealing with the subject of the trust, but says that this protection may
be waived by the parties provided there is no undue influence. Thus far, the
case is squarely in line with the great weight of authority. Cohen v.
Hutchins (App. D. C. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 397; Miller v. Dodge (1899) 28 Misc.
640,59 N. Y. S. 1070; In Re Sykes (1909) 2 Ch. 241. As the Court points out,
such a clause is reasonable in that the purchasers of the notes, which were
to be sold to the public by the firm of which the trustee was a member, would
expect the firm to make certain that the property on which the notes were
based was properly protected by insurance. The Court states that a power
given for a consideration, or coupled with an interest, or given for security,
may not be revoked. It concludes that the power to insure was given for
security, since it was contemplated that the trustee might acquire some of
the notes issued under the deed of trust. Some of this language is most
unfortunate, although it enables the Court to reach a correct conclusion in
the instant case. Missouri, like most other states, has long held that a power
given for a consideration may be revoked at any time, although the principal
will be liable for damages (such as here the amount of the commissions in-
volved). Staroske v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. (1911) 235 Mo. 67, 138 S. W.
36. At least according to precedent, the power in the principal case is
clearly not a power coupled with an interest, for the general American rule
requires that the interest be in the subject-matter of the power. State ex
rel. Walker v. Walker (1885) 88 Mo. 279; aff'd (1888) 125 U. S. 339; Kil-
patrick v. Wiley (1906) 197 Mo. 123, 95 S. W. 213; cf. comprehensive note
(1929) 64 A. L. R. 380. The Court might have rested its decision upon the
statement that a power given for security cannot be revoked. Hunt V.
Rousmanier (1823) 8 Wh. 174; Gilbert v. Holmes (1871) 64 Ill. 548; Ter-
williger v. Ontario C. & S. R. R. Co. (1896) 149 N. Y. 86, 43 N. E. 432.
Hence it was unnecessary to struggle to find an interest in the trustee for
which the power might serve as a security. It is settled also that a power
given as security for the claims of a third person cannot be revoked without
first obtaining the consent of the beneficiary. Stewart v. Hilton (C. C. D.
Vt. 1881) 7 F. 562; Wood v. Kerkeslager (1909) 225 Pa. 296, 74 AtI. 174;
American L. & T. Co. v. Billings (1894) 58 Minn. 187, 59 N. W. 998. It may
be hoped that Missouri courts will not be misled by the narrow ground for
the decision in this case into refusing to apply the principle to cases in which
the trustee has no similar power to acquire securities issued under the deed of
trust.
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Even with its limitations, the decision is to be welcomed as settling a point
of law which has been moot. As a practical matter the existence of this
power in the trustee is advisable, since it makes it more likely that the in-
surance will be placed with strong companies which pay losses promptly.
The commissions which the trustee receives from the insurance companies do
not increase the premiums which the borrower would have to pay if he took
out the insurance himself, while they may serve as an inducement for trustees
to act for lower fees, thus lessening the present heavy burden of fees which
the prospective borrower must pay. G. W. S., '33.
FRAUD-PROMISE WITH PRESENT INTENTION NOT TO PERFORM.-Plaintiff
was an experienced banker, capable of managing a banking business. The
defendants, a group of stockholders in a bank, pooled 250 shares of the
capital stock, and appointed Cooke to sell it at a fixed price of $135 per share.
The market value of the stock was $95, which fact was known to plaintiff.
He was induced to purchase the stock, and pay this premium on it by a prom-
ise on the part of the defendants that inasmuch as they held the majority of
the stock in the bank they would make him managing officer of the bank at
a salary of about $300 per month. The defendants, at the time of making
the promise did not intend to perform. The court sustained a demurrer to
plaintiff's petition. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court holding:
Fraud cannot be predicated upon a mere promise though accompanied by
present intention not to perform. Reed v. Cooke (Mo. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d)
275.
It is a well known and accepted rule in the law of fraud and deceit that
an actionable representation must relate to past or existing facts and cannot
consist of mere broken promises, unfulfilled predictions, or erroneous con-
jectures as to future events. 26 C. J. 1087. However, to this rule there are
several well recognized exceptions. State of mind can be just as much of an
existing fact as the state of digestion. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice. ( Eng.)
29 Ch. D. 459; Deyo v. Hudson (1919) 225 N. Y. 602, 122 N. E. 635; Swift 'v.
Rounds (1897) 19 R. I. 527, 35 Atl. 45. This rule has been extended to al-
low recovery on the basis of fraud and deceit where a promise has been made
with a present intent of future breach. Wright v. Barnard (D. C. D. Del.,
1917) 248 F. 756; Birmingham Warehouse Co. v. Elyton Land Co. (1891) 93
Ala. 549, 9 So. 235; Olson v. Smith (1912) 116 Minn. 430, 134 N. W. 117.
As pointed out by the dissenting judge in the principal case, twenty-one
American states, England, and the Federal courts, have adopted this view.
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin originally
held, to the contrary. But in each of these states more modern decisions
have abandoned the former position so that now it is probable that recovery
could likewise be had there upon such a state of facts. Bowe v. Gage
(1906) 127 Wis. 245, 106 N. W. 1074.
Other authorities hold that a misrepresentation of intention is purely
promissory and is therefore not remediable fraud. Farris v. Strong (1897)
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